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COMMENTARY
In the pursuit of truth, we should not prioritize correlational over causal
evidence
IOANA A. CRISTEA 1,2 & PIM CUIJPERS 3,4
1Department of Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania; 2Department of
General Psychology, University of Padova, Padova, Italy; 3Department of Clinical Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam,
Amsterdam, The Netherlands & 4EMGO Institute for Health and Care Research, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
(Received 29 July 2016; revised 15 August 2016; accepted 28 September 2016)
Wampold et al. (2017) offer a compelling critique of
three recent meta-analyses maintaining superior
effects of cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) over
other psychotherapies, for psychopathology in
general and for social phobia. The paper illustrates
how easy it is to make basic errors in meta-analyses,
and that the results of such meta-analyses can, like
any other type of research, be interpreted in different
ways. It is also in line with a series of papers and other
publications led by the author advocating the notion
that all psychotherapies have comparable effects and
work mainly through non-specific mechanisms that
all therapies have in common (Wampold, 2001).
The present work, along with others on this subject
(Castonguay, Eubanks, Goldfried, Muran, & Lutz,
2015), makes a further case that research should
move to identifying the ingredients of psychotherapy
that are responsible for change in clinically relevant
outcomes. In our commentary, we will discuss this
issue in more depth.
In their article, Wampold et al. recommend that
“the field needs to identify the ingredients of psy-
chotherapy responsible for change.” While the
authors restrain from giving examples of such ingre-
dients, it can be assumed that they have common
factors in mind, a research area the lead author
himself championed and expanded (Wampold,
2001). However, while the ideal of identifying
causal ingredients is in itself of value, there are
several problems with its implementation. For one,
the notion that these general ingredients exist in the
first place and that they are the driving force behind
change in clinically relevant outcomes still needs to
be empirically demonstrated. This is a hypothesis
in itself and it needs to be falsified on its own. In
other words, the fact that evidence is scarce for
specific differences between psychotherapies, both
in terms of efficacy and in terms of purported mech-
anisms of change (Cristea et al., 2015), simply
means that the null hypothesis “there are no specific
differences” cannot be rejected. However, stating
that all therapies work by some common ingredients
or mechanisms is another, new, hypothesis, which
needs its own empirical substantiation. This brings
us to the next point, regarding the kind of evidence
that would be necessary to falsify this claim. As we
have argued elsewhere (Cuijpers, 2013), most of
the evidence that has been offered in support of
this assertion is simply correlational and cannot
form the basis for causal inferences. But we have
also hinted to an even deeper problem: in practical
terms, studying treatment mechanisms with designs
that are as sound in terms of clinical validity as
that of the randomized controlled trial is simply
not feasible at the moment.
For example, we recently showed that more than
one hundred comparative outcome trials, directly
comparing two or more psychotherapies for adult
depression have been published (Cuijpers, 2016).
However, all trials are heavily underpowered and do
not even come close to having sufficient power for
detecting clinically relevant differential effect sizes.
Moreover, the quality of the majority of these was
subpar, so even meta-analyses of these trials cannot
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say with any degree of certainty whether there really
are differences between psychotherapies or not. We
also showed in another systematic review that dis-
mantling and other component studies in depression
are even more severely underpowered (Cuijpers,
Cristea, Karyotaki, Reijnders, & Hollon, 2010). Of
the 19 identified component studies of psychothera-
pies for depression, only one had sufficient power to
detect a relevant differential effect between the treat-
ment with the added component (emotional regu-
lation) and the standard therapy without the
component (Berking, Ebert, Cuijpers, & Hofmann,
2013). Incidentally, this study also found a signifi-
cant benefit of the added component over the stan-
dard therapy. None of the other trials had enough
power to detect an effect size smaller than g= 0.49,
and more than half of the trials only had sufficient
power to detect an effect size smaller than g= 1.0.
These reviews demonstrate that the empirical evi-
dence for the contention that all therapies are
equally effective is not that strong at all and may
be related to the low quality and lack of statistical
power of most studies in this field. As we stated,
the present state of the field is such that the only
thing we can affirm with some degree of certainty
is that the null hypothesis “there are no specific
differences” cannot be rejected. However, this does
not imply that this hypothesis can be considered
proven. It also does not mean that an alternative
specific hypothesis about common mechanisms or
ingredients is most likely true.
In conclusion, we commend Wampold and col-
leagues for their painstaking critical analysis. Many
of their arguments are valuable food for thought
and will undoubtedly be much discussed. It was
also disquieting to read about refusals of data or pro-
tocol sharing, particularly from lead CBT research-
ers. It is our hope that these claims will be further
explored and answered. We stand in full agreement
with the authors in affirming that the current
balance of evidence indicates that it is unlikely that
CBT is more effective than other psychotherapies
and that this notion probably holds for psychopathol-
ogy in general and for many specific disorders. In
fact, it needs to be said that the meta-analyses criti-
cally discussed by Wampold et al. (2017) add to an
array of others that did not find added benefits of
CBT over other psychotherapies (Barth et al., 2013;
Cuijpers et al., 2013). Nevertheless, the converse
contention that hence all therapies must work
through universal mechanisms or common ingredi-
ents has yet to be supported with internally valid
empirical evidence.
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